"LET´S CARE OUR PLANET"

We only need to take a look around the marvels of our planet, we still have wild and beautiful parts...Let´s take some awareness

"DO WE REALLY CARE ABOUT THE WORLD´S HUNGER?"

Many would say the main thing is to look at the needs in our country before venturing to worry other nation´s need as far away as Africa.

 But i´d like to share this video in order to make a simple comparison of the food´s problems around the world, which is a problem that need to be concerned by each of us. It is true our country has high rates of poverty (about 52 million poor people between 2008-2010- 48% aproximately), where only Between 5 and 9% living below poverty line.

Now look at the Africa´s landscape:

-Africa is the world´s second largest and second most populous continent (after Asia)
-It covers around 6% of the Earth´s total surface area and 20.4% of the total land area.
-There is 1 billion people (2009) in 61 territories, accounting for about 14.72% of the world´s human population.
-Although Africa has aboundant natural resources, Africa´s remains the WORLD´S POOREST and MOST UNDERDEVELOPED continent.
-The World Bank estimated (2009) that 80.5% of the populations is living below poverty line, that means, around 805,000 million of people living with less than one dolar a day.

That said, we can see the world needs...How we can simply help??? DO NOT THROW FOOD AWAY!

"10 RULES OF LIFE BY BILL GATES"

Before ending this course and being closer to finish our carrers, I would like to share this video which probably many of you have already seen, anyway I THINK ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER ONE THING: in this life no mistake is fault of anyone but ourselves and our task is to ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY AND ESPECIALLY TO RECOGNIZE THAT REAL LIFE IS FULL OF SUCCESSES AND FAILURES WHERE THE FAILURE DOES NOT MEAN YOU HAVE LOST BUT MEANS YOU MUST START AGAIN

"TOP 10 RICHEST COUNTRIES IN 2050"

I really got amazed about this video, the question is: Could Mexico be the 5th economy 39 years from now?? and so on...Will China rise to the first place??

I got so many doubts about those 10 top future countries.

"IS MEXICO THE ONE THAT WILL CAUSE THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICA??"

To understand Mexico and USA current situation and approaches is it necesary to take a look to the HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN ECONOMY...

Since the mid-1980´s, Mexico has undergone an economic transformation in record time, a feat that few other developing countries can claim. The change in Mexico´s economy from state control to an open market is both a tribute to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his predecesor, Miguel de la Madrid, and a reminder of the county´s all-too-recent financial woes. To apreciate how far Mexico has come in less than ten years, a quick review of the country´s turbulent past is in order, as well as a preview of what challenges may lie ahead for Mexico.

* THE ERA OF STATE CONROL
Ever since the mexican revolution of 1917, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional PRI has dominated the political landscape. As the facto ruling party of Mexico, PRI has controlled both federal and state government for decades through financing party activities and the media.

*ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN THE 1990´S
 In 1985, President De la Madrid began the painful process of rebuilding the Mexican economy, this time based on a market orientation, not state control.
When Carlos Salinas replaced him in 1988m the new PRI sponsored president continued tearing down the old statist foundations.
Thanks to the reforms of de la Madrid and Salinas, more than 80% of the 1,155 state-run Mexican enterprises have been sold, merged or closed to date.
The Salinas Administration has directed government agencies and the remaining state enterprises to stop discriminating against foreign vendors.

In addition, price controls and technical specifications favoring domestic suppliers and cartels are being dismantled.

*THE CORRUPTION THAT REMAINS
Of course president Salinas and his successor must also transform the political process to make these economic reforms last. It´s virtually impossible to run an open-market oriented economy if business face arbitrary decisions by local regulators.

*NAFTA AND BEYOND
When Carlos Salinas steps down as president in 1994, he wants the North America Free Trade Agreement signed by all three member countries. The mexican current account deficit topped US$20 billion in 1992 and was expected to exceed US$24 billion by 1993. So far, a steadt fow of foreign capital has sufficiently covered most of the gap.

What is true about NAFTA and out of it is that any company considering a move to Mexico must balance the risks and rewards-based on long-term bottom line, not latest free trade. Whit or whitout NAFTA, Mexico will still be plagued by potholed highways, commomplace corruption, enviromental messes and a history of deep state invovement in the economy.

USA can be afraid of mexico´s internal movements, but US companies, particulary automobile manufactures, have been drawn to Mexico for decades for capturing lower wages in maquiladoras and using mexican labor to assemble produts for export by adding value in the country before reexport to the USA.

By: Laurence Hecht and Peter Morici
Hardvard Business Review

                                               

                                  "WHY CHINA KEEP US AT NIGHT?"

China bestrides the world of political risk like a colossus. Many experts tout it as the great invesment opportunity of the new millennium, but it is also a great unknown, Among the questions political risk analysts are studying: Can China´s explosive economic growth survive its corrupt and inefficient political system?

China´s continued expansion depends on the central government´s capacity to handle complex economic transactions and avoid instability. At the same time, the state must juggle huge security, demographic, and political challenges. Imminent agricultural, banking, and urban policy reforms will probably produce even more complex management problems for the countryps dysfunctional bureaucracy.

China appears to be inching toward instability as reforms strain the relationships between national and regional leaders, increasing the probability of an economic shock followed by a political one. Complicating matters, China´s bureaucracy laks the administrative control necessary to modulate the pace of an economic slowdown.

Analysts of economic risk tend to base projections for China´s growth rates on its past performance. But there are few countries for which past performance is so poor a predictor of future results. With a few notable exceptions, such as the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square, social unrest is modern-day China has been rare. But the risk of popular unrest is going up as a result of widening income inequality, slowing economic growth, and continuing official abuse and corruption.

The urban unemployed and migrant workers could stage protests; rural rebelion over land reclamations and onerous administrative fess could escalate.

China´s leaders might then clamp down on the media, religious groups, use of the internet, and other forms of expression and communication.

The probability of such events occuring in the short-term is low, but China´s risk indicators suggest it is rising.

By: Ian Bremmer. Harvard Business School. "Managing risk in an unstable world"

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"WHY SAUDI ARABIA KEEP US AT NIGHT?"

Saudi Arabia´s stability is under fire from religious and secular forces. Islamic extremists hope to undermine the legitimacy of The Royal Family.

Real unemployment us estimated to be between 20% and 25%m frustrated jobless young men are flocking to mosques and schools where religious leaders thunder against the infidels. Western nations, meanwhile, are calling on the royals to move toward political liberalization. And the flight of expatriates will eventually take its toll on the Saudi´s ability to divesify their economy.

Such volatility complicates financial deals and extends the exposure to political risk over the time.

But what companies with long-term investments must worry, short-term investors in Saudi Arabia have less cause of concern. That´s because oil money stabilizes the political system, and the royal family can count on those revenues for years to come.  Yes, oil supplies are a tempting target for terrorists; but the country´s oil infraestructure is isolated from population centers, and redundancies in the pipeline system make it almost impossible to inflict lasting damage with a single blow. In addition, the National Oil Company has the technology, the trained engineers, and the spare capacity to continue producing significantly more than 9 million barrels per day.

Finally, in light of concerns that foreign governments might freeze Saudi assets fllowing September 11, 2001, a great deal of money flowed back into the kingdom, providing the House of Saud with more ready cash.

Clearly, any project in Saudi Arabia that needs a decade to show a profit is deeply problematic. But those willing to brave volatility in the near term may profit from opportunities that more risk averse companies forgo.

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW-june 2005 "Making Risk in an Unstable World"

THE VIETNAM WAR: AMERICA ENTERS THE WAR

La guerra de Vietnam fué un conflicto que tuvo lugar desde 1959 hasta 1975, donde el origen principal fueron las guerrillas del Vietcong (comunistas del Sur) apoyadas por Vietnam del Norte para con el objetivo de derrocar al gobierno del Sur.

El enfrenamiento no quedó solamente entre las dos Coreas, sino que se extendió a Laos y más tarde a los países de la Indochina convirtiéndose en un conflicto Internacional donde los Estados Unidos seguido por otros 40 países apoyaron a Vietnam del Sur, mientras que la URSS y China a Vietnam del Norte.

La conclusión básica-como en cualquier otra guerra- es que el intervencionismo juega el papel de intensificador de guerra y ataque, quebrantano los orígenes soberanos de cualquier movimiento y sobre todo violando los tratados internacionales de paz firmados posteriores a la IIWW

La guerra de Vietnam se caracteriza por la participación activa de civiles que padecieron directamente los efectos de los furtivos ataques y bombardeos norteamericanos, por lo que es considerada una de las guerras más violentas y con grandes estragos tanto para Vietnam como para los EEUU, se utilizaron armas químicas que mutilaron a cientos de civiles, se devastó el medio ambiente y las secuelas en la salud pública aún son evidentes.

Es de vital importancia que las naciones busquen conjuntamente el mantenimiento de la paz, dejando del lado los intereses politico-comerciales la soberanía y libertad de autogobierno deben ser prioridades para cada nación, el NO intervencionismo, los tratados de Neutralidad y la búsqueda de negociaciones de paz en territorios de conflicto son las armas primordiales para evitar enfrentamientos armamentistas que no sólo afectan a  los países en coflicto, sino a la humanidad entera.

Comparto este video que me parece muy interesante en el marco de las nuevas tendencias globales y el surgimiento de las llamadas "Economias Emergentes".

Hace algunas semanas tuve la oportunidad de asistir a la confrencia "Aspects of the Current Political Situation in Africa", impartida por el Director de Asuntos Exteriores de la República de Kenia- Embajador: Phillippe Mwanzia-, donde se tocaron temas de relevancia para el continente africano en general, el rezago económico africano y los retos que sus 54 países enfrentan ante los nuevos posicionamientos y reposicionamientos de las potencias y de los bloques regionales.

Nótese que a pesar del resago económico de la región, Sudáfrica pasó a formar parte de los denominados "BRIC´S" (Brasil, Rusia, Indidia, China, Sudáfrica). Países emergentes debido a su acelerado crecimiento económico que inciden en la economía mundial (principalmente debido al intercambio comercial que mantienen con países industrializados).

Lo anterior denota un cambio en la estructura comercial en conjunto con su régimen y el funcionamiento de las instituciones internacionales principalmente.

Todo esto deja ver que los países desarrollados tienen hoy por hoy un gran reto competitivo, pues grandes economías emergen y lideran el comercion actualmente, nótese el caso asiático.

THE ARAB SPRING

RE-EXAMINING THE ARAB SPRING

By George Friedman

On Dec. 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire in a show of public protest. The self-immolation triggered unrest in Tunisia and ultimately the resignation of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This was followed by unrest in a number of Arab countries that the global press dubbed the "Arab Spring." The standard analysis of the situation was that oppressive regimes had been sitting on a volcano of liberal democratic discontent. The belief was that the Arab Spring was a political uprising by masses demanding liberal democratic reform and that this uprising, supported by Western democracies, would generate sweeping political change across the Arab world.

It is now more than six months since the beginning of the Arab Spring, and it is important to take stock of what has happened and what has not happened. The reasons for the widespread unrest go beyond the Arab world, although, obviously, the dynamics within that world are important in and of themselves. However, the belief in an Arab Spring helped shape European and American policies in the region and the world. If the assumptions of this past January and February prove insufficient or even wrong, then there will be regional and global consequences.

It is important to begin with the fact that, to this point, no regime has fallen in the Arab world. Individuals such as Tunisia's Ben Ali and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak have been replaced, but the regimes themselves, which represent the manner of governing, have not changed. Some regimes have come under massive attack but have not fallen, as in Libya, Syria and Yemen. And in many countries, such as Jordan, the unrest never amounted to a real threat to the regime. The kind of rapid and complete collapse that we saw in Eastern Europe in 1989 with the fall of communism has not happened in the Arab world. More important, what regime changes that might come of the civil wars in Libya and Syria are not going to be clearly victorious, those that are victorious are not going to be clearly democratic and those that are democratic are obviously not going to be liberal. The myth that beneath every Libyan is a French republican yearning to breathe free is dubious in the extreme.

Consider the case of Mubarak, who was forced from office and put on trial, although the regime -- a mode of governing in which the military remains the main arbiter of the state -- remains intact. Egypt is now governed by a committee of military commanders, all of whom had been part of Mubarak's regime. Elections are coming, but the opposition is deeply divided between Islamists and secularists, and personalities and ideological divisions in turn divide these factions. The probability of a powerful democratic president emerging who controls the sprawling ministries in Cairo and the country's security and military apparatus is slim, and the Egyptian military junta is already acting to suppress elements that are too radical and too unpredictable.

The important question is why these regimes have been able to survive. In a genuine revolution, the regime loses power. The anti-communist forces overwhelmed the Polish Communist government in 1989 regardless of the divisions within the opposition. The sitting regimes were not in a position to determine their own futures, let alone the futures of their countries. There was a transition, but they were not in control of it. Similarly, in 1979, when the Shah of Iran was overthrown, his military and security people were not the ones managing the transition after the shah left the country. They were the ones on trial. There was unrest in Egypt in January and February 2011, but the idea that it amounted to a revolution flew in the face of the reality of Egypt and of what revolutions actually look like.

Shaping the Western Narrative

There were three principles shaping the Western narrative on the Arab Spring. The first was that these regimes were overwhelmingly unpopular. The second was that the opposition represented the overwhelming will of the people. The third was that once the unrest began it was unstoppable. Add to all that the notion that social media facilitated the organization of the revolution and the belief that the region was in the midst of a radical transformation can be easily understood.

It was in Libya that these propositions created the most serious problems. Tunisia and Egypt were not subject to very much outside influence. Libya became the focus of a significant Western intervention. Moammar Gadhafi had ruled Libya for nearly 42 years. He could not have ruled for that long without substantial support. That didn't mean he had majority support (or that he didn't). It simply meant that the survival of his regime did not interest only a handful of people, but that a large network of Libyans benefitted from Gadhafi's rule and stood to lose a great deal if he fell. They were prepared to fight for his regime.

The opposition to him was real, but its claim to represent the overwhelming majority of Libyan people was dubious. Many of the leaders had been part of the Gadhafi regime, and it is doubtful they were selected for their government posts because of their personal popularity. Others were members of tribes that were opposed to the regime but not particularly friendly to each other. Under the mythology of the Arab Spring, the eastern coalition represented the united rage of the Libyan people against Gadhafi's oppression. Gadhafi was weak and isolated, wielding an army that was still loyal and could inflict terrible vengeance on the Libyan people. But if the West would demonstrate its ability to prevent slaughter in Benghazi, the military would realize its own isolation and defect to the rebels.

It didn't happen that way. First, Gadhafi's regime was more than simply a handful of people terrorizing the population. It was certainly a brutal regime, but it hadn't survived for 42 years on that alone. It had substantial support in the military and among key tribes. Whether this was a majority is as unclear as whether the eastern coalition was a majority. But it was certainly a substantial group with much to fight for and a great deal to lose if the regime fell. So, contrary to expectations in the West, the regime has continued to fight and to retain the loyalty of a substantial number of people. Meanwhile, the eastern alliance has continued to survive under the protection of NATO but has been unable to form a united government or topple Gadhafi. Most important, it has always been a dubious assertion that what would emerge if the rebels did defeat Gadhafi would be a democratic regime, let alone a liberal democracy, and this has become increasingly obvious as the war has worn on. Whoever would replace Gadhafi would not clearly be superior to him, which is saying quite a lot.

A very similar process is taking place in Syria. There, the minority Alawite government of the Assad family, which has ruled Syria for 41 years, is facing an uprising led by the majority Sunnis, or at least some segment of them. Again, the assumption was that the regime was illegitimate and therefore weak and would crumble in the face of concerted resistance. That assumption proved wrong. The Assad regime may be running a minority government, but it has substantial support from a military of mostly Alawite officers leading a largely Sunni conscript force. The military has benefited tremendously from the Assad regime -- indeed, it brought it to power. The one thing the Assads were careful to do was to make it beneficial to the military and security services to remain loyal to the regime. So far, they largely have. The danger for the regime looking forward is if the growing strain on the Alawite-dominated army divisions leads to fissures within the Alawite community and in the army itself, raising the potential for a military coup.

In part, these Arab leaders have nowhere to go. The senior leadership of the military could be tried in The Hague, and the lower ranks are subject to rebel retribution. There is a rule in war, which is that you should always give your enemy room to retreat. The Assad supporters, like the Gadhafi supporters and the supporters of Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh, have no room to retreat. So they have fought on for months, and it is not clear they will capitulate anytime soon.

Foreign governments, from the United States to Turkey, have expressed their exasperation with the Syrians, but none has seriously contemplated an intervention. There are two reasons for this: First, following the Libyan intervention, everyone became more wary of assuming the weakness of Arab regimes, and no one wants a showdown on the ground with a desperate Syrian military. Second, observers have become cautious in asserting that widespread unrest constitutes a popular revolution or that the revolutionaries necessarily want to create a liberal democracy. The Sunnis in Syria might well want a democracy, but they might well be interested in creating a Sunni "Islamic" state. Knowing that it is important to be careful what you wish for, everyone seems to be issuing stern warnings to Damascus without doing very much.

Syria is an interesting case because it is, perhaps, the only current issue that Iran and Israel agree on. Iran is deeply invested in the Assad regime and wary of increased Sunni power in Syria. Israel is just as deeply concerned that the Assad regime -- a known and manageable devil from the Israeli point of view -- could collapse and be replaced by a Sunni Islamist regime with close ties to Hamas and what is left of al Qaeda in the Levant. These are fears, not certainties, but the fears make for interesting bedfellows.

Geopolitical Significance

Since late 2010, we have seen three kinds of uprisings in the Arab world. The first are those that merely brushed by the regime. The second are those that created a change in leaders but not in the way the country was run. The third are those that turned into civil wars, such as Libya and Yemen. There is also the interesting case of Bahrain, where the regime was saved by the intervention of Saudi Arabia, but while the rising there conformed to the basic model of the Arab Spring -- failed hopes -- it lies in a different class, caught between Saudi and Iranian power.

The three examples do not mean that there is not discontent in the Arab world or a desire for change. They do not mean that change will not happen, or that discontent will not assume sufficient force to overthrow regimes. They also do not mean that whatever emerges will be liberal democratic states pleasing to Americans and Europeans.

This becomes the geopolitically significant part of the story. Among Europeans and within the U.S. State Department and the Obama administration is an ideology of human rights -- the idea that one of the major commitments of Western countries should be supporting the creation of regimes resembling their own. This assumes all the things that we have discussed: that there is powerful discontent in oppressive states, that the discontent is powerful enough to overthrow regimes, and that what follows would be the sort of regime that the West would be able to work with.

The issue isn't whether human rights are important but whether supporting unrest in repressive states automatically strengthens human rights. An important example was Iran in 1979, when opposition to the oppression of the shah's government was perceived as a movement toward liberal democracy. What followed might have been democratic but it was hardly liberal. Indeed, many of the myths of the Arab Spring had their roots both in the 1979 Iranian Revolution and later in Iran's 2009 Green Movement, when a narrow uprising readily crushed by the regime was widely viewed as massive opposition and widespread support for liberalization.

The world is more complicated and more varied than that. As we saw in the Arab Spring, oppressive regimes are not always faced with massed risings, and unrest does not necessarily mean mass support. Nor are the alternatives necessarily more palatable than what went before or the displeasure of the West nearly as fearsome as Westerners like to think. Libya is a case study on the consequences of starting a war with insufficient force. Syria makes a strong case on the limits of soft power. Egypt and Tunisia represent a textbook lesson on the importance of not deluding yourself.

The pursuit of human rights requires ruthless clarity as to whom you are supporting and what their chances are. It is important to remember that it is not Western supporters of human rights who suffer the consequences of failed risings, civil wars or revolutionary regimes that are committed to causes other than liberal democracy.

The misreading of the situation can also create unnecessary geopolitical problems. The fall of the Egyptian regime, unlikely as it is at this point, would be just as likely to generate an Islamist regime as a liberal democracy. The survival of the Assad regime could lead to more slaughter than we have seen and a much firmer base for Iran. No regimes have fallen since the Arab Spring, but when they do it will be important to remember 1979 and the conviction that nothing could be worse than the shah's Iran, morally or geopolitically. Neither was quite the case.

This doesn't mean that there aren't people in the Arab world who want liberal democracy. It simply means that they are not powerful enough to topple regimes or maintain control of new regimes even if they did succeed. The Arab Spring is, above all, a primer on wishful thinking in the

"NUNCA HAY UNA SOLA HISTORIA"

"Del huipil a la chilaba"